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Failed Policy as Seen in the Solar Trade War 
Emma Weirich  
 
Abstract 
Increasing protectionist policies in the United States has attempted to protect solar manufacturing 
jobs; however, it has created negative repercussions for the majority of the industry. This paper 
aims to analyze the 2018 30% US tariff on all imported photovoltaic cells and modules and whether 
or not it has been an effective policy to protect and encourage the solar industry. To do so, the 
paper will analyze similar tariffs enacted in 2012 and 2014 by the United States to understand how 
the tariffs have been impacting the solar energy’s labor market and photovoltaic module and cell 
price fluctuations. By researching past trends, this paper will argue the 2018 tariff is a failed policy 
because it negatively impacts the majority of the solar market by increasing the price of 
photovoltaic cells and modules, and the tariff is set at an insufficient rate to protect domestic solar 
manufacturers efficiently. Future policy change is then needed to encourage solar jobs by focusing 
more on the installation sector, rather than the manufacturing industry.  
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INTRODUCTION 
         The solar panel industry has been experiencing recent high tariffs since January 2018, 
beginning at 30%, with plans to decrease 5% each year until 15% is reached in 2021. Such a 
protective measure marked the beginning phases of the current trade war between China and the 
United States and has potentially impacted the growth of the solar panel market in the United 
States. Before the tariff was implemented, domestic solar panel jobs had been increasing from 
2010 to 2016. The next two years showed the first decrease in solar panel jobs (The Solar 
Foundation, 2019). During 2017, solar panel manufacturing industries urged the federal 
government to impose the current tariffs, while the installation sector fought against. 
It was predicted the tariff would not add jobs to the manufacturing sector and instead hurt 
the installation business because they rely on imported solar panels. The Solar Energy Industries 
Association predicted in 2018 the tariff would negatively impact the solar market by decreasing 
more jobs in the market ("President's Decision on Solar Tariffs is a Loss for America," 2018). 
Solar panel manufacturing companies in the United States compete directly with foreign-made 
panels, mainly less expensive Chinese solar panels. The current tariff on solar panels benefits 
domestic solar panel manufacturing companies because the increasing prices of foreign-made 
solar panels decrease price competition. Theoretically, this would make foreign-made solar 
panels compete at the same price as domestic made ones; thus, consumption of domestically 
produced solar panels would increase. However, the tariff harms companies who install solar 
panels because they often import the less expensive, foreign-made solar panels. With the tariff in 
place, the installation companies now have to purchase more costly solar panels and potentially 
lay-off workers due to the increased cost of production. In fact, Reuters called public attention to 
the tariffs, explaining the tariff cost the loss of 62,000 solar jobs and $19 billion in investment, 
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and they increased the price of panels, thus damaging the health of the solar industry (Groom, 
2019). With fewer jobs and investment in the solar market and more expensive solar panels, 
consumers will be less inclined to install them. The tariff then creates an opportunity cost 
whereby carbon emission increases as potential consumers are deterred by this now more 
expensive renewable energy. In a world with growing climate change, especially regarding 
humankind's carbon footprint, a push towards renewable energy is essential to curtail its effect; 
however, the tariff appears to discourage solar installation and encourage more expensive, 
domestically-made solar panels. 
Given the different reactions of the solar panel tariff on the solar panel market, further 
research is warranted into how the tariff is affecting the solar market which prompts the current 
research project. This project will investigate if the solar tariff is a failed policy by analyzing the 
jobs lost in the industry and its relations to increased photovoltaic cell and modules pricings, and 
what it could mean for further development in reusable energy.  
         This paper is organized into three main sections: the growing solar market, the beginning 
of solar tariffs, and analysis. The first section discusses the global production chain of 
photovoltaic (PV) cells and modules and explains why China has a comparative advantage in the 
solar manufacturing sector. It will also discuss the historical rise of solar modules and how China 
became a large producer of PV cells and modules, as well as the policies they created to 
encourage the market. The United States involvement in the solar panel market will also be 
discussed, and their trade relationship they formed with China. The second section discusses the 
trade tension beginning in 2011 between the United States and China over Chinese-made PV 
cells and modules. It will analyze the political involvement over the creation of tariffs and how 
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the 2012 and 2014 tariff affected both countries. The last section will be the analysis that will use 
the 2012 and 2014 tariff as a reference for how the 2018 tariff has affected the solar market. 
THE GROWING SOLAR MARKET 
Global Supply Chain of Photovoltaic Modules 
         The global demand for solar energy stemming from photovoltaic (PV) cells did not 
notably begin until 1997 and has grown exponentially since 2003 (de la Tour, Glachant & 
Ménière, 2010). To understand PV cells and modules and why certain countries, such as China, 
have been able to dominate the manufacturing sector, it is essential to understand its supply 
chain. To create PV modules, the supply chain is broken up into four manufacturing segments: 
silicon, wafers, PV cells, PV modules. De la Tour (2010) analyzes the global chain of PV 
modules and finds the percentage cost of each segment seen in Figure 1 below. For example, 
27% of the cost for a solar panel comes from the cell section of the production chain, and it 
accounts for only 11% of the panel’s profit. Creating the cells into modules is 33% of the final 
panel costs, and it is the least profitable section at only 7%. 
Figure 1: PV Chain of Production as of 2007 
Segment  % Cost 
in a 
Panel 
Market 
Concentration 
(HHI)  
Investment Cost 
(Millions/USD) 
Technological 
Barrier Height 
% of 
Profit 
Silicon 13% 0.19 140 High 41% 
Ingot and 
Wafer 
27% 0.24 95 Medium/High 41% 
Cells 27% 0.04 125 Medium/Low 11% 
Module  33% <0.04 25 Low 7% 
Figure from de la Tour et al., (2010) 
In 2007, China was the world leader in cell production and module assembly, whereby they 
produced 27% of the world’s PV cells and modules (de la Tour et al., 2010). Cell production in 
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China has minimum barriers because technology is easily accessible, and module production is 
labor-intensive and requires little investment (de la Tour et al., 2010). China has an abundance of 
labor, mainly stemming from migrants. While wages have been growing for the past decades, 
their salary is comparatively cheaper than the United States giving them a comparative 
advantage in the production of PV modules and cells (Pagnattaro, 2009). 
Figure 2: Employment by Sector, 2010 - 2019 
 
Data from Solar Foundation 
The United States has been unable to dominate in the global market of PV cell and 
module manufacturing due to their lack of comparative advantage. Instead, the U.S. solar market 
is mainly comprised of the solar installation sector with products mostly coming from China. 
Figure 2 shows that since 2011, the manufacturing industry had grown from 24,064 employees to 
33,726 in 2018. While increasing, its ratio to the whole solar market has been decreasing from 
once ~20% in 2011 to 13.92% in 2018. In contrast, the installation market had grown from 
52,503 in 2011 to 155,157 in 2018; however, it has experienced a recent downturn since 2016. 
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The employment trends will be analyzed in more detail pertaining to the 2012 and 2014 tariffs in 
the following section, the beginning of solar tariffs: 2010-2014. 
1996 - 2010 Solar Market 
 This section will review how China became a world producer of PV cells and modules by 
analyzing the government subsidies the manufacturing and installation sector obtained starting in 
1996 and ending in 2010. It will also discuss how the United States subsidized its solar market 
through government programs but was unable to compete against Chinese made PV cells and 
modules due to competitive pricing.  
 China's role in the global supply chain of PV cells and modules began with government 
subsidies primarily in 1996. Chen (2015) discusses the different subsidies China conducted in the 
solar panel market, such as China's first solar policy first implemented in 1996 called the 
Brightness Program. The Brightness Program was China's first national policy to promote solar 
energy in specifically rural regions and pushed the manufacturing firms to expand their 
production (Zhang, Andrews-Speed & Ji, 2014). The 2017 Renewable Energy Law of the 
People's Republic of China and its Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable 
Energy (2007) encouraged the Chinese government to invest $263 billion in solar and other 
renewable energy projects which took "responsibility for developing national standards for solar 
systems in buildings…and management regulations of urban construction to create good 
conditions for the development of solar systems in buildings" in 2007 (Medium and Long-Term 
Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China, 2007). This plan lasted until 2020 with the 
expectation of creating 1800 MG more of solar power. Doing so spurred China's PV module 
installation sector, and in turn, encouraged its domestic manufacturing industry. Chen (2015) 
also notes other government subsidies, which took form as cheap land, tax cuts, and easy loan 
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availability to manufacturers. One key example Chen (2015) discusses are the tax rebates many 
exporter solar manufacturing firms were given. It was found that Wuxi Suntech, a lead solar 
exporting firm, was given $1.42 billion in tax rebates and in other sources of refunds (Chen, 
2015). By doing so, China enhanced its competitiveness in the global market by aiding 
technological advancements and infrastructure through financial assistance. Subsides allowed 
China to gain a stronger comparative advantage to focus on the module and cell production line 
of solar panels, compared to the United States.  
Figure 3: World Production of Solar Modules/Cells 
 
Figure from Jäger-Waldau (2019) with self-added policies 
The amount subsidies Chinese manufacturing firms were given allowed the firms to mass 
produce solar cells and modules, which can be seen in Figure 3. Since China began supporting 
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the industry before the United States and with large amounts of tax incentives and projects, the 
industry grew exponentially, making China dominate the business with little competition.  
In contrast, the United States did not focus on solar energy in earnest until 2005 with the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Scully Capital, 2018). The Act created a tax credit up to 30% for 
those who installed solar projects and created the Loan Guarantee Program (LPG). The LGP 
gave loans for projects with high technology risks to “avoid, reduce or sequester air pollutants or 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; and employ new or significantly improved 
technologies as compared to commercial technologies in service in the United States at the time 
the guarantee is issued” (Scully Capital, 2018, p.6). Such loan programs were not intended to 
improve technology but instead encouraged commercial use of solar panels through installations. 
This then encouraged the installation market for PV modules, but not necessarily the domestic 
manufacturing sector, because installers focused on importing PV cells and modules.  
It was not until 2009 with the creation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) that the solar manufacturing industry was given a tax incentive. The report specifies a 
30% tax credit was given to specific projects that focused on the manufacturing of renewable 
energy. At the same time, the ARRA provided additional tax credits to facilities producing 
energy from renewable energy, which was approximately $13 billion. This would mainly benefit 
the installation industry because it incentivized the demand for solar modules nationwide. The 
report also specifies that during Barack Obama’s presidency, the Renewable Energy and 
Efficient Energy (REEE) projects “added $500 million of loan guarantee authority, making the 
total available approximately $4.5 billion” (Scully Capital, 2018, p. 6). The REEE project again 
encouraged commercial use; hence, it incentivized the installation sector.  
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Compared to China, there were little U.S. policies to incentivize the manufacturing of 
solar cells and modules, causing the sector to grow slowly and have low production output 
compared to the rest of the world. Figure 3 demonstrates the United States had a small presence 
in the world market and was greatly outcompeted by China's production. The United States' 
comparative advantage for solar cell and module manufacturing is small; as such, the U.S. would 
gain more from encouraging the installation sector to grow. The policies then promoted the 
installation sector, which grew over the years seen in Figure 2.  
THE BEGINNING OF SOLAR TARIFFS: 2012-2014 
This section is broken into three parts: theory of tariffs, 2012 tariff, and 2014 tariff. The 
first section will analyze how tariffs are formed in the political realm and connect it to the solar 
tariffs. The next two parts are important in understanding how tariffs have impacted the domestic 
solar market, and their results will be used later in the analysis. The second section will review 
the 2012 tariff by analyzing how it was created, the terms of the tariff, and its impact on both the 
United States and China by looking specifically at investment levels in China, employment in the 
United States, and level of PV cell and module imports from China. It will also look at the 
tariff’s political repercussions. By doing so, the section uses previous scholarly articles that 
argue that the tariff only created negative results for the U.S., making it a failed policy. The third 
section will explain the 2014 tariff’s effect on the solar market by analyzing its impact on import 
levels, pricings of PV cells and modules, and political backlashes it created.  
Theory of Tariffs 
To understand how the manufacturing industry gained political power, it is vital to know 
how and why tariffs are formed. Ray (1987) analyzes how interest groups can give rise to 
protectionism and views such special interest groups as the primary influencer behind 
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protectionist policies, as politicians comply with their special interests to stay in office and hold 
support from dominant groups. Most interestingly, protectionist policies seem to be encouraged 
by a combination of special interest groups, political actors, and foreign policy (Ray 1987). More 
specifically, Hughes and Meckling (2017) see the increase of tariffs as stemming from a 
coalition created between select solar manufacturing firms and political members. What is most 
surprising about the coalition is the small proportion manufacturing firms make up when 
analyzing the solar market - 13.92% in 2018, seen in Figure 2. The figure explains how small 
factors can influence the market by using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). By using 
the ACF, Hughes and Meckling (2017) combine trade institutions into a function comprised of 
interactions from coalitions that are defined by actors within the political system. Manufacturing 
interest groups, such as SolarWorld, partners with government actors to create a coalition with 
the goal of a policy subsystem. Politicians do so because they gain an image as a “protector” of 
blue-collar jobs, which the United States values, and domestic manufacturing firms do so to gain 
price protection from foreign trade through tariffs. Politicians also obtain a defender image 
because since they are favoring the manufacturing industry, it appears they are protecting the few 
against the majority, in this case, the few U.S. manufacturers against the world manufacturers. 
Hughes and Meckling (2017) point to Senators, most notably Oregon Senator Ron Wyden, who 
pushed for a dumping investigation against China in 2011 because Solar World is based in 
Oregon. By pushing for such legislative action, Senator Wyden worked with the solar panel 
manufacturing sector, i.e., Solar World, and attempted to maintain a constituency’s interest in 
hopes of re-election. Senator Wyden also worked alongside the United States foreign policy 
agenda by targeting China’s use of subsidies, which are seen as unfair competitive practices. 
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Large manufacturing businesses have been able to successfully lobby for protectionist 
policies because there are few companies in the solar market, 24 to be exact (U.S. solar panel 
manufacturers, 2018). This makes it feasible for the companies to discuss similar trade goals and 
petition to key legislature figures for representation. In comparison, there are thousands of 
installation companies in the United States (Solar Industry Research Data, 2019). The large 
number of installation businesses creates a collective action problem, whereby the contribution 
of each company is perceived as insignificant when attempting to obtain a goal, creating a free-
rider problem that creates less incentive for businesses to participate (Oatley, 2015). Oatley 
(2015) explains the greater the size of the group, the smaller the impact each individual creates, 
creating less incentive for businesses to participate. The collective action problem explains why 
installations companies are less likely to dominate trade policies for solar modules and cells 
because each installation company has a strong incentive to free ride. There are too many 
installation companies to effectively collaborate and petition against the tariff or create trade 
policies to benefit themselves. 
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2012 Tariff 
Figure 4: Origin of Imported Solar Cells and Modules in the United States (Kilowatts) 
 
* signifies data for Malaysia is unavailable 
** signifies data for Philippines is unavailable 
*** signifies data for Malaysia and Philippines is unavailable 
**** signifies data for Taiwan and Philippines is unavailable 
*****signifies data for Taiwan, Philippines, and Malaysia is unavailable 
Data from IEA International Energy Agency 
Even with U.S. tax and loan incentives for the solar manufacturing industry, imports of 
Chinese-produced solar cells and modules continued to rise, especially after 2008, as seen in 
Figure 4. Figure 4 demonstrates the growth of Chinese module imports into the United States, 
wherein 2014, Chinese solar modules represented over 50% of module imports. While imports 
increased beginning in 2010, a push against Chinese P.V. cells and modules grew from the 
domestic manufacturing sector in the United States. In 2011, a German subsidiary solar 
manufacturing company, SolarWorld, along with six other manufacturing companies, filed a 
petition against Chinese made solar panels for dumping the panels and cells into the United 
States, as previously mentioned (Hughes & Meckling, 2017). SolarWorld argued the U.S. 
manufacturing firms had been injured due to imported Chinese-made cells and modules that had 
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been subsidized by the Chinese government, making them uncompetitive. The International 
Trade Commission (I.T.C.) ultimately found Chinese solar firms guilty of dumping certain 
crystalline silicon photovoltaic products and imposed a 31% tariff on certain Chinese made cells 
and modules and a 250% tariff on others, going into effect in 2012 (Commerce Preliminarily 
Finds Countervailable Subsidization of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not 
Assembled into Modules from the People’s Republic of China, 2012). While the U.S. 
manufacturing firms approved the I.T.C. investigation, there was considerable controversy from 
the U.S. installation companies who relied on the less expensive P.V. cells and modules. 
The 2012 tariff was the beginning of a political and economic struggle between the 
domestic manufacturing and solar installation industry. The tariff was celebrated by the 
manufacturing industry — with represented 24% of the solar labor market — because it was 
expected to increase the price of Chinese made panels and encourage the purchase of 
domestically made ones (The Solar Foundation, 2019). However, Caprotti (2014) argues the 
tariff ignores the installation sector — which represented 55% of the solar labor market — who 
benefited from importing Chinese-made solar modules because the modules “stimulate the U.S. 
solar installation industry, thus promoting the generation of new green-collar jobs in the USA” 
(Caprotti, 2014; The Solar Foundation). 
  The 2012 tariff effect on the solar labor market can be seen in Fondacaro, Harter, Matam, 
Redzepovic, and Tang’s (2014) research, where they analyze the costs and benefits of the 2012 
tariff. Fondacaro et al. (2014) examines the cost by accumulating data of the lost opportunity 
cost the tariff imposed, the social cost of increased carbon emissions from fossil fuels, and the 
economic impact of foregone job creation. The benefit was calculated by the U.S. revenue made 
and the amount of carbon emissions circumvented through the tariff. The research finds that 
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2012 solar tariff cost to the U.S. solar market is greater than the benefits by a margin of $1.24 
billion, and, thus, the tariff was a failed policy. 
Figure 5: Average Value of Photovoltaic Modules in the United States (USD per watt) 
 
Data from Solar Photovoltaic Cell/Module Shipments—Energy Information Administration 
While it was expected for the price of modules to increase, Figure 5 demonstrates the 
price continued to decline until 2014. The decline could be linked to China industries 
outsourcing to neighboring countries to circumvent the 2012 tariff.  
As a reaction to the 2012 tariff, China also imposed its own tariffs on U.S.-made 
polysilicon, which is a crucial resource used to create solar energy; domestic investment thus fell 
from $27.6 billion to $8.8 billion. Stroup (2019) argues the consequences of the tariff in 2012 in 
the United States substantially outweighed the potential new manufacturing jobs, making it a 
failed policy. Meanwhile, Chinese solar manufacturing firms outsourced their production line to 
other Asian countries, allowing them to circumvent the tariff.  
Understanding the effect of the 2012 U.S. tariffs on China is necessary to realize the E.U. 
implemented a similar tariff in 2013. Zhang et al. (2014) found that Chinese solar firms, such as 
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Suntech Power, defaulted on their debt in response to the United State’s and additional E.U.’s 
tariff, ultimately pushing the Chinese government to assist the struggling solar firms. It was 
revealed that Chinese solar firms over-relied on exporting as a source of revenue, and the 
domestic industry was not a viable substitute for the loss of revenue. As a result, Zhang et al. 
(2014) note that from 2012 to 2013, DPV - distributed photovoltaic - programs were executed by 
Chinese officials to increase demand for P.V. cells and modules by increasing the number and 
sizes of solar power plants into a State Grid. The program allowed smaller solar farms to connect 
to the State Grid and waived approval requirements; by doing so, legal technicalities and 
paperwork were drastically decreased, thus, encouraging solar farms to expand. The State Grid 
project strengthened China’s installation sector as well as its manufacturing industry. Such 
subsidized policies also helped improve the stock performances of Chinese manufacturing solar 
firms and increase domestic demand for solar panels (Crowley, Meng, & Song, 2019). By doing 
so, large solar firms who had connections to the government were less affected than smaller 
firms by focusing on supplying their domestic installation sector. With this said, Crowley et al. 
(2019) found that smaller firms lacking government connections experienced a greater negative 
effect than SOE’s (State Owned Enterprises) in their stock market performance in response to the 
E.U. tariff. The authors tie the negative impacts private firms faced to the subsidies that the 
government prioritized to SOE’s over private firms. 
Chinese solar panel imports began to diminish after 2012, as shown in Figure 4 because 
Chinese solar firms outsourced their production line of PV cells and modules to other Asian 
countries (Haley & Schuler, 2011). Stroup (2019) explains the PV cells and panels could be built 
outside of China but assembled in China and still be considered a non-Chinese made product. 
Due to the loophole, Chinese firms began to circumvent the tariff by outsourcing their chain of 
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production to neighboring countries, specifically to Taiwan (Stroup, 2019). Fondacaro et al. 
(2014) found that nearly 70% of imports coming from China had cells manufactured in Taiwan 
in 2013, making them an exemption to the 2012 tariff. While the tariff attempted to protect the 
solar panel industry, it was considered ineffective because Chinese solar manufacturing 
companies could relocate their production to other Asian countries, such as Thailand or Vietnam, 
effectively avoiding the tariff altogether (Jeong & Hultman, 2018). 
3. 2014 Tariff 
Due to the loophole, SolarWorld filed another petition in 2013, resulting in a new anti-
dumping investigation but against Taiwan and China. The ITC found dumping and issued a tariff 
in June 2014 on certain Taiwan PV products as well as Chinese made PV products (Jeong & 
Hultman, 2018). The new 2014 U.S. tariff targeted Taiwan-made PV products with 11.45% and 
27.55% tariff and China with a 26.71% to 165% tariff (Commerce Finds Dumping of Imports of 
Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from China and Taiwan and Countervailable 
Subsidization of Imports of Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products from China, 2014). 
While the tariff did affect Taiwan made crystalline silicon photovoltaic products, Chinese 
companies continued to outsource their production to neighboring countries. Nguyen and 
Kinnucan (2019) explain the 2014 tariff affected China less so than the 2012 tariff because 
Chinese firms had already built other manufacturing facilities in neighboring countries, such as 
Malaysia, South Korea, and Singapore. Ngugyen and Kinnucan (2019) suggest 40,713 jobs were 
lost in the United States on average due to the discriminatory 2014 tariff, while it only created 
22,402 jobs in the manufacturing industry. The drastic differences in the number of jobs created 
and lost stems from the unbalanced representation of manufacturing jobs in the solar market, 
where manufacturing represents roughly 20% of the market. They argue that the number of jobs 
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the tariff created does not compensate for the loss “from installation, sales and distribution, 
project development, and the other components of the solar energy industry” (Nguyen & 
Kinnucan, 2019). 
The 2014 tariff on Taiwan and Chinese made PV cells and modules appeared to have had an 
impact on the pricing of modules because it grew from $0.75 in 2013, to $0.87, as seen in Figure 
5. This could be because of China’s reliance on Taiwan made PV cells in their product, which 
made up 70% of its solar exports to the US (Fondacaro et al., 2014). In response to the tariff, the 
United States was hit with another polysilicon tariff from China in 2014, which had long-term 
consequences. Feldman and Margolis (2019) found that China’s 57% tariff on US-made 
polysilicon as a significant burden to the US silicone manufacturing industry because production 
was 55% lower in 2018 than it was in 2014. The effect of the 2014 tariff did not only affect the 
PV cell and module sector but indirectly the polysilicon industry as well. This then made the 
2014 tariff a failed policy because the costs greatly outweighed its benefits. 
ANALYSIS  
 This paper’s analysis will be based on research findings of the 2012 and 2014 tariffs to 
develop an understanding of how they have been affecting the solar panel labor market. I will 
first analyze the explain the 2018 tariff and the arguments surrounding its impact. I will then use 
an economic model representing the supply and demand for solar cells and modules and indicate 
what the 2012, 2014, and 2018 tariff has done. By doing so, I can explain their impacts and 
elaborate on how the recent 2018 tariff can potentially impact the domestic solar industry 
negatively. 
2018 Tariff 
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 As discussed previously, Suniva and SolarWorld, both manufacturing companies in the 
United States, petitioned for an anti-dumping case in May 2017. The ITC determined the 
“increased solar cell and module imports are a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic 
industry,” resulting in a 30% tariff against all global imports of PV cell and module products. 
The first 2.5 GW - Gigawatts - of imported PV products would be excluded from the tariff, but 
after such, a 5% decrease per year would occur for the next three years. 
The previous tariffs in 2012 and 2014 continue to impact different sectors of the solar 
market, and the efficacy of achieving their primary goals of protecting the domestic 
manufacturing industries have been inefficient. Jeong and Hultman (2018) argue the newly 
implemented 2018 tariff is doing little to promote the manufacturing industry because of how 
dominant Chinese solar modules and cells are in the world market. Their dominance is 
demonstrated in the pricings of modules, whereby Chinese modules are $0.18 cheaper than 
Californian-made ones in 2017 (IRENA 2018).  
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Theoretical 2018 Tariff Impact 
Figure 7: Economic Modul of 2012, 2014, and 2018 Tariff  
 
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of the 2012 and 2014 tariff and predicts what the 2018 tariff 
could hypothetically achieve. Abboushi (2014) notes the demand for PV cells and modules are 
price sensitive, making the demand curve flat to represent elasticity. Johnson (2011) researches 
the long-run price elasticity of supply for renewable generation. While their research includes all 
renewable energy, such as wind, biomass, and solar, they note supply elasticity is 2.7 for the 
combined markets. A 1% increase in price would then increase production by 2.7% for all 
renewable energy sectors combined. Johnson’s (2011) research demonstrates how price can 
substantially change renewable energy production. 
Before the 2018 tariff was in place, the World Price was far below P*, which represents 
market equilibrium in the domestic US market for PV cells and modules. The domestic suppliers, 
shown in line S, were only able to supply PV modules and cells at SWPQ  before 2012 because of 
the World Price they were competing against. This created the producer surplus - shown as the 
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dark blue triangle - and a larger consumer surplus - seen as the yellow, red, green, and light blue 
shapes combined. When the 2012 tariff was implemented, prices continued to decrease from 
$1.59 in 2011 to $0.75 in 2013, shown in Figure 5. The price continued to decrease due to 
outsourcing from Chinese companies, which decreased the cost of production and increased the 
supply of global imports in the year 2014. This caused the 2012 tariff to be a failed policy due to 
the continued decreasing price of U.S.-made products. 
Figure 8: Percentage Change of the Average Price of Photovoltaic Modules in the United 
States (USD per watt)  
 
Data from Solar Photovoltaic Cell/Module Shipments—Energy Information Administration 
However, the 2014 tariff appeared to influence the US market because the price increased 
by 15% and in 2016 by 2%, seen in Figure 8. The increased prices led to a new price seen in 
Figure 7, which decreased consumer surplus to the yellow and light blue boxes and increased 
producer surplus to the dark blue and red boxes.  
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The labor market was affected by the 2014 tariff by decreasing the labor market’s 
installation and failing to assist the manufacturing sector in 2017. In 2017, employment in the 
solar installation industry fell by 1,235 and manufacturing by 974, seen in Figure 2. The tariff 
impacted the installation sector more so than the manufacturing because the installation sector 
represented 66% of the solar market in 2017, while manufacturing represented only 7%. Since 
installers rely on less expensive PC cell and module prices, the increased price stemming from 
the tariff impacted them more and did not raise the price high enough to encourage job growth in 
the manufacturing industry.  
When the 2018 30% tariff was implemented, it did so to increase solar cell and module 
prices to a competitive market rate, represented as P* in Figure 7. The increase to P* would 
allow the domestic suppliers of PV cells and modules to compete against global competitors, not 
just Asian competitors because global competitors have to price the products at the same price as 
the US domestic manufacturing firms. Now producer surplus has increased to the dark blue, red, 
and lower lighter blue shapes, while consumer surplus has decreased to only the top light blue 
shape. Increasing the price of PV cells and modules to P* and sell at Q* would allow the 
manufacturing firms in the US to theoretically grow their industries, hire more employees and 
allow them to compete against Chinese and any other foreign nation firm. This would also 
decrease imports because domestic installation firms could now purchase more U.S.-made solar 
cells and modules at the same price as foreign-made products. However, this would come at a 
cost to consumers, as seen in the decreased consumer surplus. While the increased price allows 
domestic suppliers to sell more expensive PV cells and modules, consumers who cannot afford 
the higher-priced goods are left out of the market as they face financial constraints, leading to 
potential layoffs for installation employees. With fewer consumers and higher pricings, fewer 
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solar panels will be installed, thus reducing the use of renewable energy, which is essential to 
curtail climate change and reduce humankind's carbon footprint. 
Figure 7 does not consider how international suppliers of PV cells and modules are 
continuing to improve in technology, increase in production, and gain more subsidies through 
government policies. This allows International supply to shift right, seen in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Economic Model of International Supply of PV Cells and Modules in the United 
States
 
 While the tax is on imported PV cells and modules, international competitors can 
continue lowering their price for the goods far below the U.S. price. Jeong and Hultman (2018) 
explain this price difference is one of the largest in the solar market, and the implemented 30% 
tariff in 2018 is not sufficient enough to close the price difference. International competitors can 
then continue to sell their cheaper, taxed PV cells and modules to domestic installers. The four-
year tariff does not allow enough time to enact policy changes or incentivize the manufacturing 
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of domestic solar panels. While the tariff may increase the price, it would negatively impact the 
majority of the solar market by cutting more labor jobs in the installation sector while only 
creating a limited number of jobs in manufacturing, which makes up 5% of the market as of 
2018. SolarWorld and SunPower, two leading manufacturing solar firms pushing for tariffs, 
declared bankruptcies in 2018, signifying the previous tariffs (2012 and 2014) did little to protect 
these companies. 
Figure 10: Monthly US Import of PV Cells and Modules (Thousand 
Kilowatts)
 
Figure from U.S. solar module imports partially recover after tariffs were imposed in early 2018 
After the tariff was implemented, imports decreased as seen in Figure 10, but soon 
increased with a temporary dip in January and February of 2019. This could be because the 2018 
30% tariff caused the price of solar modules and cells to fluctuate at the price of $0.45. While 
imports decreased from approximately 550,000KW to 300,000KW from January to April 2019, 
we can expect an increase in imports because the tariff at 30% will only last for one year, then 
decrease by 5% consecutively for the next three years. Its impact on the solar market labor 
market will reduce by year, allowing the solar installation sector not to feel as financially 
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constrained over time, but will still result in continued layoffs due to the short-term increase in 
cost production. The manufacturing industry will not gain the entire benefits of the tariff due to 
the decreasing tariff rates and will most likely continue to decrease in employment size. The 
2018 tariff will then be considered an ineffective policy because it does not protect the 
manufacturing industry and harms the majority of the solar market by raising PV cell and 
module rates.  
LIMITATIONS 
 To remain transparent, this paper acknowledges that its analysis has some limitations. 
One of the main weaknesses in the analysis is assuming the change in price since 2012 is 
because of the tariffs of 2012, 2014, and 2018. It is impossible to point to a specific event or 
change in the cost to the change in price because so many variables are inputs of a good’s final 
price. With PV cells and modules, there are many steps in its creation, and a change in either the 
cost of creating silicon, ingots and wafers could change the price of PV cells and modules since 
each step is needed to make the final product. This paper is also limited in understanding the full 
reasoning behind the labor market fluctuations. Again, many variables go into why the labor 
market fluctuates and is not always explicitly tied to the price of PV cells and modules in the 
solar market. 
CONCLUSION 
 The United States and China have been experiencing a solar trade war since 2012, which 
has negatively affected both domestic markets. Investment and the solar employment market in 
the United States have felt the tariffs’ effects, causing a decline in solar employment since 2017. 
The decline in jobs can be attributed to the price increase and stabilizing force in imported PV 
cells and modules due to the 2014 tariff and expected impact in the 2018 tariff. With increasing 
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PV cell and module prices, installment companies are forced to increase their cost of production 
and lay off workers due to financial constraints. The domestic manufacturing industry is still 
facing heavy global competition because Asian countries produce the majority of PV cells and 
modules. While the 2018 tariff is aimed to protect the solar market, it ultimately creates more 
costs than benefits because more jobs are lost in the installment sector than it saves in the 
manufacturing industry. The goal of protecting green jobs in the solar market should not be 
focused on the manufacturing industry, but instead on the installation sector because the sector 
makes up the bulk of the market and is connected to others such as marketing, wholesale, and 
maintenance. Policies such as state or federal government-funded solar fields in rural 
communities or requiring states to create solar energy initiatives could bolster the installation 
sector and, in turn, create a higher demand for employment. By encouraging the installation 
sector, a positive public externality can be generated because solar energy emits less carbon than 
fossil fuels. There is an increasing demand for renewable energy as humankind begins to 
understand carbon emissions are perpetuating climate change. If the United States encourages 
the installation sector, more affordable solar power would be available to a broader range of 
consumers and ultimately support the fight against climate change by decreasing carbon 
emissions. The economic progress of the solar market in the United States and for renewable 
energy is then dragged down by the tariff as it ends up increasing solar module and energy 
prices. The tariff should then be seen as a failed policy, and government change is needed to 
address the health of the solar market. 
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